Author: Thomas Fritz
introduction
The EU-US trade agreement is a major setback for a sustainable economic policy. Under pressure from Chancellor Merz and German car companies, the European Commission made far-reaching concessions to Trump. But these undermine the much-needed social-ecological transformation in the EU. The Commission is unconditionally cutting tariffs, renouncing labour and environmental standards, opening the floodgates for fossil energy, risking billions of dollars in bad investments, divulging due diligence obligations piecemeal and sacrificing a sovereign tax, digital and security policy.
The PowerShift briefing describes key risks of the EU-US trade agreement. To this end, it analyses the Framework Agreement, which was published by both sides in the form of a joint declaration on 21 August 2025.[1] The contours of this agreement had already been agreed by US President Trump and Commission President von der Leyen on 27 July 2025 in a political agreement.[2] The briefing also shows whose interests the individual agreements serve and how the Commission ignores mandatory procedures for international agreements. It becomes clear: Negotiation without an official negotiating mandate jeopardises democracy and the legitimacy of European politics.
summary
- The framework agreement between the EU and the US breaks with the previous practice of EU trade policy by providing for tariff dismantling without any environmental or labour standards.
- The EU is committed to massively increasing fossil energy purchases in the US, undermining Europe's climate goals, energy transition and decarbonisation.
- In addition, the EU is committing hundreds of billions of euros to potentially high-risk investments in the US, the selection of which is determined by the Trump administration.
- The EU agrees to remove ‘unjustified barriers’ to digital trade, which the US government understands as the whole of EU tech regulation. The Commission has already abandoned individual projects.
- Among the "unjustified barriers" that the EU is supposed to remove is the US government's implementation of the global minimum tax and digital taxes. With regard to the minimum tax, Germany, France and Italy have already buckled before the USA.
- The EU commits to softening green deal laws such as the Deforestation Ordinance and the Supply Chain Act under US demands. Here, too, it has already made its first concessions to the United States.
- In the framework agreement, the EU and the US announce the mutual recognition of their automotive standards. In doing so, however, the Commission is putting road safety at risk, as there are no standards comparable to EU standards in the USA.
- The EU is committed to removing trade barriers for many US agricultural products. This provides favourable market access for goods produced in a manner that is harmful to the environment and in breach of labour rights, including pork, soybean oil and nuts.
- According to the agreement, the EU plans to "substantially increase" arms purchases in the US. However, the EU has no authority to commit them. In addition, the EU states are already increasing their dependence on the increasingly unpredictable US government with increasing arms purchases in the USA.
- Together, the EU and the US want to increase pressure on third countries that, for legitimate industrial policy reasons, want to restrict raw material exports, refuse international tenders for their public contracts or impose tariffs on digital trade.
- The negotiation process is undemocratic and violates European law. The Commission has not received a mandate or negotiating directives and has bypassed Parliament. It has not carried out an impact assessment or a public consultation.
- The disastrous result of the trade deal is largely due to concerted pressure from Chancellor Merz and the German auto lobby. Both urged the Commission to come to a quick conclusion and at the same time circumvented it through their own negotiations with the US government.
Reduction of customs duties without social guardrails
The EU commits in the framework agreement with the US to eliminate all tariffs on US industrial goods and to grant trade preferences for many agricultural and fisheries products. In return, the US promises to replace part of the high tariffs that US President Trump has levied on imports from the EU since April 2025 with a cap of 15 percent. This should apply to the majority of EU goods.[3] This does not include the US tariffs on steel and aluminium, which Trump had raised to 50 percent. In order to implement the trade deal’s customs agreement, the Commission published two proposals for regulations on 28 August 2025, the approval of which is currently being discussed by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament.[4] In this report alone, it estimates the annual loss of revenue due to tariff dismantling to be more than 4.8 billion euros.[5]
In addition, the two customs regulations show that, unlike the EU’s previous trade agreements, the EU-US deal is not subject to any conditions. There are no environmental, social, labour or human rights standards to which trade preferences are linked. This is particularly irresponsible against the backdrop of aggressive deregulation under the current US administration. For example, Trump not only prompted the US to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement again, but also the elimination of national climate protection measures such as limiting CO2 emissions.[6] In addition, the US government is dragging down a whole range of labour standards, including minimum wage standards, occupational health and safety, non-discrimination and unemployment insurance.[7]
In addition: The tariff preferences granted by the EU to the US violate the most-favoured-nation principle of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).[8] According to this principle, tariff advantages granted to one WTO member must in principle be extended to all other WTO members. However, since the EU does not intend to do so, WTO lawsuits are threatened by those countries that feel discriminated against by the deal. In addition, the Commission is playing its nimbus as a defender of the rules-based multilateral trade order.[9]
Fossil energy purchases instead of consistent decarbonisation
According to the framework agreement, the EU intends to buy oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and nuclear goods from the US for $750 billion by 2028, i.e. $250 billion per year. Since the EU imported fossil energy, mainly oil and LNG, from the US for US$76 billion in 2024, this would amount to more than tripling. This would make the US the EU’s main energy supplier, accounting for around 70 per cent of total EU energy imports (approximately US$355 billion in 2024).[10] This would make the EU extremely dependent on a single supplier country and would make it even easier to blackmail than has been the case so far. It would also block its energy transition and jeopardise its climate target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent by 2030.
With reference to the trade deal, US gas companies and Trump's energy secretary Chris Wright are putting massive pressure on them to undermine additional EU regulations such as the methane regulation.[11] Because the emission limit values of the regulation particularly threaten the exports of US LNG, which is obtained with the extremely polluting and emission-intensive method of fracking. In order to serve US export interests, several EU governments have already campaigned to include the methane regulation in a next Commission omnibus package to deregulate the energy sector.[12]
In addition, the trade deal completely ignores the environmental and health burdens of fracking and LNG terminals in the US and Europe. While ecosystems are threatened by noise, wastewater and chemicals, local residents face higher health risks from environmental pollution. For example, higher rates of cancer, heart attacks and early deaths are recorded in the affected regions.[13]
Investments by Trump-Gusto
The framework agreement also calls for the EU to invest $600 billion in strategic sectors in the US by 2028. How the US government envisages implementing this commitment can be found in a memorandum signed by Japan as part of its trade deal with the US. [14] After that, the US alone decides which projects the Japanese investments will go into (Japan committed to 550 billion US dollars). A U.S. investment committee selects projects for which Japan must pledge funding within 45 days; Otherwise, there is a threat of tariff increases. The Trump-appointed committee also oversees project execution and compliance with commitments. The profits from the investment go half to the US and Japan, but only until the Japanese investments have amortized. After that, 90 percent of the profits go to the United States. Investments can be made in various industries, including mining, energy, artificial intelligence or quantum computers.[15]
If the EU accepts a similar deal, it could therefore be forced to finance climate-damaging projects in the US, such as LNG terminals or oil pipelines, which turn out to be investment ruins due to the global energy transition (so-called stranded assets). European investments could also flow into the equally risky mini-nuclear power plants, which are supposed to supply data centers for the AI industry or cryptocurrencies with electricity. In addition to the oil and gas industry, the Trump administration is also promoting these mini-nuclear plants. At the same time, it deliberately slows down renewable energies.[16] It is difficult to understand why the Commission agreed to this risky investment commitment. The funds that the EU is to invest in the US are urgently needed for the socio-ecological transformation of the European economy. Unlike in the US under Trump, they could also finance sustainable projects here.
Under fire: Regulation of digital monopolies
The EU also commits in the Framework Agreement to remove ‘unjustified barriers to digital trade’. While the Commission is clearing that European tech regulations (including the Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), AI Act, etc.) are not one of these barriers, the US government sees it quite differently. Already in February 2025, Trump announced in a memorandum against "foreign blackmail" that his government would sanction all countries with tariff increases, the discriminatory regulations of which reduce the profits of US tech companies. Measures such as platform regulations, content moderation requirements, restrictions on data transfer or streaming charges "violate American sovereignty" and "loot American companies", according to the memorandum.[17] The US government deliberately attacked European requirements that ‘undermine free speech or promote censorship’. DSA and DMA would "dictate how US corporations interact with consumers in the European Union".[18]
The U.S. sanctions threats are having a significant impact. Already bent over the US pressure, the European Commission is in its planned AI liability directive. This provided for civil liability of the digital companies for damages caused by artificial intelligence. But after U.S. Vice President Vance came out against EU AI regulation, the Commission withdrew this directive.[19] Similarly, EU Commissioner Teresa Ribera came under pressure. At the beginning of September, she wanted to announce her sentence in the antitrust proceedings against Google. She accuses the US monopolist of anti-competitive behaviour in the online advertising market. Trump, however, had threatened in advance with "significant additional tariffs".[20] As a result, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič intervened and tried to prevent the publication of the sentence.[21]
In order not to jeopardize the trade deal with the US, the Commission is also delaying its case against X, the social network of the far-right US billionaire Elon Musk. It opened this procedure already in December 2023. This was due to alleged network violations of the Digital Services Act (DSA).[22] Civil society organisations now fear that the Commission will weaken EU tech laws again as part of its comprehensive deregulation in favour of US multinationals.[23] For example, the DSA and the DMA could be dragged down in the course of upcoming evaluations, while the AI Regulation is endangered by the omnibus package for deregulation of digital law.[24]
Attack on tax sovereignty and the global minimum tax
Among the "unjustified barriers to digital commerce" that the trade deal will remove, the Trump administration also includes taxes on digital services and the global minimum tax for large corporations. In his memorandum against ‘foreign blackmail’, Trump threatened those countries with trade sanctions that require US corporations to pay digital taxes or apply the global minimum tax of 15 percent to them.[25] In 2021, 140 countries, at the initiative of the OECD and the G20, agreed on the minimum tax for large corporations with a turnover of more than $750 million. Trump, however, declared on his first day in office the withdrawal from this multilateral treaty.[26]
The European G7 countries Germany, France and Italy are now bent over the global minimum tax. Following Trump's threats, they agreed in June 2025 to a G7 statement exempting U.S. corporations from the minimum tax. However, since the minimum tax in the EU is already transposed into national law by a directive, the Union and trade associations in Germany are now also calling for its suspension. Otherwise, there was a risk of competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the US multinationals.[27]
Taxes on digital services, which already exist in several EU countries (including France, Italy, Austria and Spain), are also at risk. Governments fear the U.S. may see them as a violation of the trade deal. In France, for example, the National Assembly decided to increase the digital tax from 3 to 6 percent. The French government, however, rejects the increase out of fear of US sanctions. The National Assembly fell short of the vote of its Finance Committee, which had previously called for an increase to 15 percent.[28] Similarly, there is growing opposition in the federal government to the levy on online platforms, the examination of which was still provided for in the coalition agreement and for which Minister of State for Culture Wolfgang Weimer is standing up. However, Minister of Economic Affairs Katherina Reiche rejects this digital tax – entirely on the Trump line – as a ‘trade barrier’. The federal government also distanced itself and declared that Weimer's proposal was not voted in the government. Meanwhile, Union leader Jens Spahn warned of an ‘escalation spiral’ with regard to the US.[29] The platform levy threatens to be sacrificed in favor of Germany's dominant export interests.
Continued erosion of the Deforestation Ordinance
In the agreement, the EU commits to diluting an entire legislative package of its Green Deal in favour of US companies, including the Deforestation Ordinance. This requires importers of forest-endangering goods to provide evidence that their imports of, inter alia, soya, palm oil, beef or wood do not originate from previously deforested land or have damaged forests. However, the Framework Agreement states that U.S. goods are only a ‘significant risk’ to global forest resources, which is why the EU will take into account U.S. corporate complaints about the Deforestation Regulation. In line with the Trump administration, 18 agriculture ministers in the EU and the European Parliament have already called for countries with an "insignificant" deforestation icon to be exempted from the proof requirements of the regulation.[30] In practice, this would mean adding a new category of countries to the regulation, which would exempt not only EU companies, but also US companies from the burden of proof.
Meanwhile, the Commission has already made several mitigations to the deforestation regulation.[31] However, the U.S. wood industry still does not go far enough.[32] Therefore, the risk remains that the regulation will also be included in the omnibus package planned by the Commission to remove various environmental requirements, as demanded by the corporate lobby.[33] Meanwhile, the Trump administration itself dismantles its claim that there is only a negligible risk of deforestation in the US. It attaches the axe to important environmental requirements to enable logging in vast areas of forest in the United States, including primeval forests.[34]
Leverage of due diligence obligations
In addition, the framework agreement commits the EU to include US claims in other green deal laws, including the EU Supply Chain Act. The law aims to enforce corporate due diligence to improve the protection of human rights and the environment in global supply chains. However, under the Framework Agreement, the EU is to enforce a “reduction of administrative burden” and changes in the “harmonised civil liability” of the law. In this regard, the Commission had previously included changes in its Omnibus I package on deregulation of sustainability rules, which the European Parliament has to negotiate with the Council and the Commission. According to the Commission's proposal, the law will only affect a small number of large corporations and will completely eliminate civil liability.[35] But even these radical changes do not go far enough for the American Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce criticizes the unchanged extraterritorial effect of the Supply Chain Act and calls for exemptions for US companies. These are justified because comparable sustainability rules apply in the USA.[36]
In an open letter, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright also increased the pressure on the EU. He called for either collecting or drastically gutting the supply chain law as it threatens U.S. LNG exports. According to the blatant threat, the implementation of the law could ‘contrary to recent trade agreements’.[37] Meanwhile, Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis openly acknowledged that the EU’s deregulation agenda also serves to “ease US concerns” and limit “exterritorial effects” of the Green Deal”.[38] Dombrovski's head of cabinet, Michael Hager, went even further and told the American Chamber of Commerce that one of the goals of the deregulation agenda was to strengthen trade policy alignment with the US.[39]
Recognition of weak car standards
According to their agreement, the EU and the US intend to mutually recognise their respective standards in the automotive sector without specifying them further. However, US standards are considerably weaker than European standards in terms of traffic safety, air pollution control and climate protection. If the EU removes industrial tariffs as planned and additionally recognizes the US standards, a flood of oversized SUVs, pickups and monster trucks from the USA threatens on European roads. Road safety would suffer as there are no regulations comparable to EU standards in the USA, such as for pedestrian protection or assistance systems for emergency braking and lane keeping.[40]
These rules have ensured that the number of road fatalities in the EU has fallen by 36 percent since 2010. In the United States, on the other hand, it rose by 30 percent overall, by 50 percent for cyclists, and by 80 percent for pedestrians. In addition, the US plans to eliminate existing motor vehicle regulations for particulate matter and emissions. Recognising the weaker US standards would also create an incentive for European carmakers such as BMW or Mercedes to relocate more production to the US. They could then benefit even more from the weak regulation and lack of trade union rights in the US and sell even more of the cars manufactured there to the EU.[41]
Unrestricted trade for agricultural factories
The agreement commits the EU to reduce tariffs on many U.S. agricultural products and to ease various non-tariff obligations, including quality certificates for pork and dairy products. In its customs regulation implementing the deal, it grants duty-free quotas of over 25,000 tonnes for pork, 400,000 tonnes for soybean oil and 500,000 tonnes for nuts, among other things.[42] However, the production methods and food standards in the USA and the EU differ considerably in some cases. For example, while the US still allows the use of the growth hormone ractopamine in pig farming, this is banned in the EU. In U.S. animal factories, an estimated 80 percent of pigs are given ractopamine as a feed additive.[43] If the requirements for import certificates of US pork are relaxed, the risk of undiscovered deliveries to the EU with hormone residues increases. U.S. soybean oil, on the other hand, is produced almost exclusively from genetically modified soybean plants, as genetically modified varieties are grown on 96 percent of soybean fields under massive pesticide use.[44] In the EU, on the other hand, the cultivation of genetically modified varieties does not play a role for reasons of species protection.
No less polluting is the most important agricultural product, besides soy, that the US exports to the EU: Nuts, especially almonds and pistachios from California. The artificially irrigated almond plantations contribute significantly to the water crisis there – unlike in Spain and Portugal, where the more sustainable almond groves mostly rely on rainwater.[45] In addition, there is a high use of pesticides in California, which is partly responsible for the deaths of billions of bees, which are transported to the almond plantations every year for pollination over long distances.[46]
In addition, labour rights violations are widespread in the U.S. agricultural and food sectors, including wage theft, child labour, ill-treatment, and slave-like employment.[47] The exploitation particularly affects migrants, who make up 70 percent of agricultural workers, many of whom do not have a residence permit. Due to their widespread fear of mass deportations under Trump, they have become even more blackmailed for plantation operators.[48]
Contracts for American gunsmiths
The trade deal also includes a very problematic clause on gun purchases. The EU plans to "substantially increase the procurement of military and defence equipment from the United States". It goes on to state: “This commitment reflects a common strategic priority to deepen the transatlantic cooperation of the defence industry”. At the presentation of the agreement with Commission President von der Leyen, Trump said that the EU would buy "military equipment worth hundreds of billions of dollars" from the US.[49] However, the EU has no authority to commit to arms purchases. Defence remains within the competence of the Member States; The EU can only complement their actions.[50] This agreement also breaks with the usual practice in international trade agreements, which exclude ‘national security’ issues with specific clauses from the scope of the rules.[51]
However, this agreement is particularly risky from a peace policy perspective. Following Russia's attack on Ukraine and Trump's repeated threat to deny NATO's commitment to assistance, the EU and member states are mobilizing increasing funds for rearmament. However, according to different estimates, between half and two-thirds of the money that EU states spend on military equipment is already going to US manufacturers. European arms purchases from American companies have increased more than six-fold in the past four years, from an average of $11 billion between 2017 and 2021 to $68 billion in 2024.[52] However, this leads to a growing dependence on an increasingly unpredictable US government.
With this agreement, the Commission has also put pressure on the US government to take action against the EU's recent rearmament plans. After all, the ReArm Europe plan envisages favouring European arms manufacturers to the detriment of the American people.[53] According to a leaked German plan, the German government also wants to order the lion's share of the armaments to be procured by the end of 2026 from European armaments manufacturers. Of the total orders of 83 billion euros, only 6.8 billion are to end up with U.S. armaments companies.[54] But Trump and his foreign minister Marco Rubio have already warned the EU not to transfer US companies in European arms purchases.[55] Last but not least, with the trade deal, the Commission is undermining not only its ‘buy European’ strategy, but also the fundamental debate on the future of EU security policy. For there are reasonable doubts as to whether the current rearmament is conducive to the restoration of peace in Europe. It can also lead to further destabilisation and even more armed conflict.[56]
Concerted action against third countries
Third countries, including countries of the Global South, are also targeting the Framework Agreement. Together, the EU and the US want to increase pressure on countries that control access to their raw materials through export restrictions. By means of concerted trade sanctions, both blocs can severely restrict the room for manoeuvre of governments that limit the export of unprocessed raw materials in order to further process them locally and promote industrial development. For example, the EU and the US have already taken action against the restrictions on the export of raw materials imposed by the Indonesian government for industrial policy reasons.[57] The EU and the US also want to coordinate when third countries impose market restrictions or refuse to open their tenders to EU and US companies. However, this puts additional pressure on economically weaker countries to open up their markets to EU and US companies, which are often much more competitive than local companies.
In addition, the EU and the US also agree on a front against the Global South in digital trade. They want to work together in the WTO to ensure that the temporary tariff moratorium on electronic transmissions, which runs until the end of March 2026, becomes a permanent ban.[58] However, economically weaker countries suffer significant financial losses due to the waiver of tariffs on digital trade.[59] They also lose an important tool for protecting their own industry. For example, their protective tariffs on goods imports become ineffective if companies can import digital products such as CAD designs for 3D printing into their countries duty-free, whether in the textile, electronics, automotive or medical technology industries.[60] Many countries in the South are therefore opposed to a permanent ban on tariffs on e-commerce, including India, Indonesia and South Africa.[61]
Authoritarian rollback instead of democratization
The Commission's approach to the negotiation of the Framework Agreement is deeply undemocratic and also contrary to European law. Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) requires the European Council to first issue a negotiating mandate to the Commission before negotiating agreements with third countries.[62] Common practice also includes the Council formulating negotiating directives for the Commission to determine the objectives, scope and timeframe of such agreements.[63] The subsequent negotiations must be conducted by the Commission in close coordination with the Council and the European Parliament. But for the months of negotiations with the Trump administration, the Commission has received neither a mandate nor negotiating directives, while the deputies were left out.[64] The Chair of the EP Trade Committee, Bernd Lange, confirmed: “The European Parliament was not involved because of this completely atypical situation.”[65]
The procedure also violates the EU guidelines for better regulation. These require an impact assessment for all Commission projects which ‘probably have significant economic, environmental or social consequences’.[66] Specifically for trade negotiations, the Commission has developed the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) tool.[67] But this instrument has also been put out of the way by the Commission for the framework agreement with the USA. Its proposal for a regulation on the elimination of tariffs on US goods states that ‘due to the need to speed up the implementation of the political agreement, the formal process of impact assessments has been suspended’.[68]
This manoeuvre also avoids the Commission conducting a public consultation on this controversial deal. The guidelines for better regulation also provide for a consultation procedure for projects accompanied by an impact assessment.[69] With its approach, the Commission has set a precedent that raises concerns about further backsliding in the transparency and democratic control of European policies. The legitimacy of the EU will continue to suffer.
A bad deal under German pressure
The fatal outcome of the trade deal with the United States is largely due to pressure from the federal government. Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz urged the Commission to come to a speedy conclusion in order, above all, to assert the interests of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), which feared for the profits in transatlantic trade. From the outset, Merz showed little confidence in the Commission and opened up its own channels of dialogue. Following his visit to the United States at the beginning of June 2025, Merz stated that he had agreed with Trump that there should be two representatives between the White House and the Chancellery "who are now talking intensively to each other about German-American trade relations".[70] At the end of June, Merz told the Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (Federal Association of German Industry) that the EU was negotiating ‘far too complicated’ and called for: “It needs to be faster now, and above all it needs to be easier.”[71] In July, he outlined the result of the customs agreement, which Commission President von der Leyen was then allowed to announce a few days later with Trump. Merz himself had proposed that the US impose tariffs of 10 to 15 percent in the future, while the EU grants free market access essentially without tariffs.[72]
Accordingly, Merz also welcomed the result achieved: "The agreement has succeeded in averting a trade conflict that would have hit the export-oriented German economy hard. This is especially true for the automotive industry, where current tariffs are almost halved from 27.5% to 15%. It is precisely here that the rapid reduction of tariffs is of the utmost importance.”[73] VDA President Hildegard Müller was also satisfied. Although the 15% tariff was a burden, it praised the fact that the negotiators could ‘avoid a further escalation of the trade dispute’. Addressing Merz, she added: “Thank you also to the Chancellor for his commitment”.[74] However, other sectors were strongly criticised, especially the German Engineering Federation (VDMA), whose exporters are affected by the 50 percent tariffs on steel and aluminium. As the duty rates also apply to products containing steel and aluminium, the association considers the deal to be ‘worthless’ to its members.[75]
Like Merz, the three major German car companies, BMW, VW and Mercedes-Benz, have undermined the Commission's conduct of negotiations. They, too, pushed for a quick agreement in Brussels and Berlin, and at the same time held their own talks with members of the US government, including US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick.[76] As the Bloomberg news agency noted, the Commission's line was "increasingly undermined by companies working to weaken the Union's negotiating position. According to EU officials, German carmakers in particular are particularly disruptive.”[77] It is obvious that the three car companies, with the active support of Merz, have exerted significant influence on the Commission and have a clear co-responsibility for this bad deal.
Green Deal instead of Bad Deal
The analysis of the Framework Agreement shows that the disastrous concessions made by the EU are largely due to German actors. Chancellor Merz and the three German car companies have exerted massive pressure to reach a quick agreement with the US. They accept the price that many other social groups in Germany, the EU and the USA pay for it. The agreement with the US is above all a heavy mortgage for the socio-ecological transformation in the EU. With the Green Deal, the EU has taken some important steps towards a more humane and environmentally sound economy. But these advances are coming under increasing pressure from inside and outside, whether through the EU's deregulation agenda or through the fatal agreement with the US.
This bad deal is particularly dangerous where regressive interests of European business associations meet with those of US corporations and the Trump administration. It unfolds an additional danger through the salami tactics with which it is implemented. Instead of a transparent procedure based on a democratic mandate with negotiating directives, the toads that people are supposed to swallow are presented to MEPs either bit by bit or not at all. Because many concessions to Trump can be fulfilled by the Commission by renouncing progressive initiatives, be it an EU-wide digital tax, the dismantling of monopolies or higher environmental and social standards. Concessions, in turn, requiring parliamentary approval, are already being integrated by the Commission into its growing package of bus and coach laws deregulating EU law. In addition, it can submit further specific legislative proposals which, similar to the two customs regulations, implement further parts of the trade deal.
To stop this dangerous development, a vigilant civil society needs to follow closely the further negotiations with the US. There needs to be strong opposition to the regressive concessions that the EU is being pushed into from within and without. The agreement with the US must be prevented in this form. Its risks to people and the environment are intolerable and the negotiation process so far is undermining democracy.
Endnotes
[1] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en
[2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_25_1930
[3] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en
[4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1993
[5] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)471&lang=en
[6] https://www.actonclimate.com/trumptracker/
[7] https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/
[8] https://baldon-avocats.com/legal-assessment-of-the-eu-us-deal-and-the-eu-proposal-of-regulation-to-eliminate-eu-tariffs-on-us-goods/
[9] https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/08/29/does-the-eu-us-trade-deal-break-wto-rules
[10] https://www.uktpo.org/2025/08/12/the-eu-us-trade-deal-supply-security-and-climate-strategy/; https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2025/10/14/trumps-750-billion-eu-energy-deal-is-built-on-an-illusion/
[11] https://gasoutlook.com/analysis/u-s-lng-lobbying-aimed-at-weakening-eu-methane-rules/; https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/fossil-fuels/gas-and-oil/new-e-u-methane-rules-a-problem-for-u-s-lng-producers/
[12] https://www.sustainableviews.com/scientists-urge-eu-to-resist-methane-lobbying-2b419d9b/
[13] https://www.duh.de/fileadmin/user_upload/download/Pressemitteilungen/Energie/LNG/Kurzfassung_LNG-USA_4_7_25.pdf
[14] https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/tariff_measures/houmon/pdf/250905oboegaki.pdf
[15] https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-documents-reveal-next-steps-us-japan-trade-deal
[16] https://taz.de/Mehr-Atomenergie-in-den-USA/!6103221/
[17] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/
[18] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-issues-directive-to-prevent-the-unfair-exploitation-of-american-innovation/
[19] https://www.euractiv.com/news/commission-withdraws-ai-liability-directive-after-vance-attack-on-regulation/; https://iapp.org/news/a/european-commission-withdraws-ai-liability-directive-from-consideration
[20] https://www.techpolicy.press/trump-squares-off-with-brussels-over-its-digital-rulebook/
[21] https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2382762/google-s-adtech-fine-pulled-at-last-minute-over-eu-us-trade-tensions
[22] https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/eu-delays-investigation-into-musk-s-x-amid-trade-negotiations-with-us-125071700973_1.html
[23] https://www.techpolicy.press/enforcement-of-eus-tech-laws-should-not-be-traded-away/;
[24] https://edri.org/our-work/consultation-response-to-the-european-commissions-call-for-evidence-on-the-digital-omnibus/
[25] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/
[26] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/the-organization-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-oecd-global-tax-deal-global-tax-deal/
[27] https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/steueroasen-mindeststeuer-praktisch-nur-in-der-eu-druck-auf-klingbeil/100161142.html
[28] https://dig.watch/updates/french-lawmakers-advance-plan-to-double-digital-services-tax-on-big-tech; https://www.franceinfo.fr/economie/budget/budget-il-n-est-pas-question-d-ouvrir-une-nouvelle-guerre-commerciale-avec-les-etats-unis-assure-le-depute-jean-rene-cazeneuve-apres-le-doublement-la-taxe-gafam_7582745.html
[29] https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/digitales/digitalsteuer-reiche-102.html
[30] https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2025/08/26/eudr-us-negligible-risk-to-deforestation/
[31] https://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/issues/nature-food/47787/eu-commission-backs-weakening-of-eu-deforestation-law/
[32] https://www.afandpa.org/news/2025/afpa-responds-latest-eudr-proposal
[33] https://www.businesseurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/2025-07-17-MBE-J.Roswall-EUDR-Implementation.pdf
[34] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/06/trump-logging-forests; https://eia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/US-civil-society-letter-re-EUDR-7-Oct-2025.pdf
[35] https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/eu-lieferketten-gesetz-102.html
[36] https://www.amchameu.eu/news/keeping-simplification-track
[37] https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-energy-secretary-and-qatari-energy-minister-send-letter-eu-regarding-proposed-corporate
[38] Politico: The EU’s new peace offering to Trump: A bonfire of its business rules, 22.10.2025: https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-red-tape-purge-turns-peace-offering-donald-trump/
[39] https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/eu-eyes-alignment-us-trade-policy-part-regulation-simplification-push
[40] https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/eu-cave-in-on-vehicle-trade-rules-will-cost-european-lives-as-us-pick-up-trucks-flood-into-europe
[41] https://www.transportenvironment.org/articles/accepting-us-car-standards-would-risk-european-lives-warn-cities-and-civil-society; https://www.fr.de/wirtschaft/zollfreiheit-fuer-us-autos-konkurrenz-fuer-deutsche-hersteller-93931637.html
[42] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)471&lang=en
[43] https://pirg.org/articles/ractopamine-used-widely-in-us-pork-despite-risks/
[44] https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-united-states/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption
[45] https://www.c-win.org/cwin-water-blog/2024/9/23/california-almond-water-usage-updated; https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4395/13/11/2834
[46] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jan/07/honeybees-deaths-almonds-hives-aoe
[47] https://investigatemidwest.org/2025/03/26/these-crop-ag-producers-are-repeatedly-cited-for-child-labor-violations/; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/25/us-farms-made-200m-human-smuggling-labor-trafficking-operation
[48] https://www.bsr.org/en/blog/managing-migrant-labor-human-rights-risks-in-us-food-value-chains
[49] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2025/07/27/eu-chief-and-trump-strike-trade-deal-in-transatlantic-standoff_6743785_19.html
[50] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/policies/european-defence-readiness/
[51] https://thecommonwealth.org/publications/commonwealth-cyber-journal-volume-2/national-security-exception-international-trade-and-cybersecurity
[52][52] https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/09/09/eu-buys-too-much-defense-equipment-abroad-especially-from-us-report/; https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/europes-dependence-us-foreign-military-sales-and-what-do-about-it
[53] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-freeze-us-multi-billion-defense-plan-arm-makers/
[54] https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-defense-donald-trump-air-defense-washington-us-weapons/
[55] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-officials-object-european-push-buy-weapons-locally-2025-04-02/
[56] https://www.greenpeace.de/publikationen/Arming_Europe_kurz_deutsch.pdf; https://www.greenpeace.de/publikationen/Kraeftevergleich_NATO-Russland.pdf
[57] https://www.petromindo.com/news/article/indonesia-to-keep-ban-on-raw-mineral-exports-despite-u-s-trade-deal; https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/08/06/the-double-standard-of-the-european-union-regarding-indonesias-nickel-export-ban/; https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-us-indonesia-tariff-deal;
[58] https://twn.my/title2/wto.info/2025/ti250213.htm
[59] https://www.ictd.ac/blog/right-to-tax-customs-duties-electronic-transmissions/
[60] https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/RP157_WTO-Moratorium-on-Customs-Duties-on-Electronic-Transmissions_EN.pdf
[61] https://twn.my/title2/wto.info/2025/ti250213.htm
[62] https://dejure.org/gesetze/AEUV/218.html
[63] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-trade-negotiations/
[64] https://baldon-avocats.com/legal-assessment-of-the-eu-us-deal-and-the-eu-proposal-of-regulation-to-eliminate-eu-tariffs-on-us-goods/
[65] https://bernd-lange.de/uploads/bernd_lange/Bernd-Lange-zum-EU-USA-Handelsdeal.pdf
[66] https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en?prefLang=de
[67] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/sustainability-impact-assessments_en
[68] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/api/files/COM(2025)471_0/090166e5215d0508?rendition=false
[69] https://baldon-avocats.com/legal-assessment-of-the-eu-us-deal-and-the-eu-proposal-of-regulation-to-eliminate-eu-tariffs-on-us-goods/
[70] https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsstreit-merz-regt-im-zollstreit-mit-usa-eine-verrechnung-von-autos-an/100133506.html
[71] https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/bundeskanzler-merz-zu-zollstreit-mit-usa-eu-verhandelt-zu-kompliziert-13901479.html
[72] https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Merz-favorisiert-einseitigen-europaeischen-Niedrig-Zoll-article25915507.html
[73] https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/bundeskanzler-friedrich-merz-erklaert-zur-einigung-von-kommissionspraesidentin-ursula-von-der-leyen-und-praesident-donald-trump-in-den-eu-us-verhandlungen–2370770
[74] https://www.vda.de/de/presse/Pressemeldungen/2025/250728_Kommentierung_Rahmenvereinbarung_EU_und_USA_im_Zollstreit
[75] https://www.vdma.eu/viewer/-/v2article/render/148971592
[76] https://www.businessinsider.de/wirtschaft/zollstreit-deutsche-autobauer-trafen-sich-mit-us-beamten-laut-bericht/
[77] https://www.msn.com/de-de/finanzen/top-stories/zollstreit-mit-den-usa-bmw-lvmh-und-co-untergraben-eu-pl%C3%A4ne/ar-AA1I5IlU
