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The European Parliament (EP) should refuse to endorse the compromise reached in trilogue with the Commission and the Council on the implementation of the EU tariff deal with the US for several reasons:
- The EP has not been able to enforce its key demands: Temporary EU customs regulations until 31.3.2028 (i.e. before the end of the Trump presidency); Reduction of U.S. tariff over 50 percent on steel and aluminum derivatives before the entry into force of customs regulations; Extension of the suspension clause to include violations of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and EU security interests.
- The entry into force of the customs regulations is short-sighted at this stage, as it is only after the completion of the currently ongoing trade policy investigations in the USA (so-called Section 301 investigations) that greater clarity could emerge as to which tariffs the USA will levy in the future.
- The ongoing US Section 301 investigations pose significant risks to EU industry, in particular to German and Irish companies. This is partly due to the fact that the US interprets the low capacity utilisation of the crisis-ridden EU industry as an indication of structural overcapacity, which would distort trade at the expense of US companies.
- The tariff deal with the US represents a blatant break with the practice of EU trade policy that has been in place since the 1990s. Unlike the EU trade agreements with other countries, the customs deal lacks not only human rights and democracy clauses, but also environmental and social clauses. This double standard of the EU weighs all the more heavily as Trump tramples on trade union rights and climate protection.
- The disastrous concessions in the customs deal are a bad harbinger of the entire framework agreement that the EU is currently negotiating with the US. With the trilogue compromise now reached, the US is almost encouraged to squeeze further problematic concessions from the EU on the other commitments as well. This is already evident in the agreed liquefied gas imports and in European digital law.
Trilogue: The Parliament has lost
In the early hours of 20 May 2026, representatives of the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament agreed in the so-called trilogue negotiations on a compromise on the implementation of the EU customs deal with the US.[i] The tariff deal is the first part of the broader framework agreement the EU is currently negotiating with the Trump administration. In the highly asymmetrical customs agreement, the EU undertakes to completely eliminate tariffs on industrial goods from the US and to grant trade preferences for numerous agricultural products. The US, on the other hand, imposes a tariff rate of around 15 percent on most imports from the EU, and even 50 percent on steel and aluminium as well as products made from them (so-called derivatives).
In order to implement the customs deal, the Commission presented two regulations, which the European Parliament wanted to add three essential conditions according to its own position.[ii] However, none of these conditions could be enforced by Parliament in the trilogue.
Firstly: Parliament called for the two customs regulations to be limited in time (the so-called ‘sunset clause’). These should expire on 31 March 2028 – 9 months before the end of the Trump presidency. Thus, the EU would have retained a means of pressure against the erratic US president. According to the trilogue compromise, however, the customs regulations are to apply until December 2029, i.e. one year after the end of the Trump presidency. Before this deadline, the Commission may present a proposal to extend the regulations. Due to this length of time beyond Trump's term of office, the trilogue compromise significantly weakens the EU's position vis-à-vis Trump.
Secondly: The European Parliament also called for the US to reduce the 50 percent tariff on EU goods containing steel and aluminium to 15 percent before the entry into force of the customs regulations (the so-called ‘sunrise clause’). The 50 percent inch affects many products of the metal industry as well as mechanical engineering. This EP demand has been completely overturned, because now the US-side tariff reduction should no longer be a precondition for the entry into force of the EU customs regulations. Instead, the Commission should present a report on US tariffs on steel and aluminium derivatives by the end of the year and decide for itself whether the tariff preferences granted to the US should be suspended if necessary. However, since the Commission has already made far-reaching concessions to the Trump administration, there is little reason to hope that it will lift preferences again if the US continues to adhere to the 50 percent tariff. Parliament, on the other hand, would lose all influence on this decision if this rotten compromise were adopted.
Thirdly: Finally, the EP called for an extension of the possibilities for a suspension of the tariff deal (the so-called “suspension clause”) should the US fail to comply with its obligations. Possible triggers should include not only further US tariff increases, but also serious human rights violations, violations of democracy and the rule of law, as well as threats to the EU’s security interests, including its territorial integrity. The background to this clause was, among other things, Trump's ongoing threats to annex Greenland, as well as the increasing attacks by Trump and his cabinet on the rule of law in the United States. However, the human rights, democracy and security clause requested by the EP was completely deleted in the trilogue negotiations.
Important here: Clauses protecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law have been standard in all EU trade agreements since the 1990s. With regard to the US, the EU is breaking with its decades-long practice of enshrining sanctioned human rights and democratic minimum standards in its trade agreements. This gives the US government a privileged position that no other trading partner enjoys, despite Trump’s continued attacks on international law and the rule of law.
Even with the remaining triggers for a possible suspension of trade preferences (such as the increase in US tariffs above the 15% threshold or discrimination against European exporters), there is no automaticity in the trilogue compromise. The decision to suspend the trade preferences shall always be left to the discretion of the Commission. The compromise authorises them to suspend, in whole or in part, the tariff cuts granted to US exporters following a previous investigation into US infringements. However, the fact that it is also taking this step consistently must be doubted according to the experience so far.
Rapid implementation: The self-deprivation of the EU
President Trump threatened further tariff increases, such as on EU car exports, should the EU not implement the tariff deal by July 4, 2026, the 250th anniversary of the US declaration of independence. This prompted the Commission and the conservative EPP Group (including CDU and CSU MEPs) to increase the pressure in the trilogue negotiations in order to speed up the agreement. With success: The compromise now reached is to be approved by the EP Trade Committee on 2 June so that the European Parliament can vote on the deal at its next plenary session on 15-18 June. So he could be in time for the U.S. independence celebrations in dry cloths, so the hope of his proponents.[iii]
But the celebrations of the United States are of course not the decisive reason for Trump's deadline. Rather, on July 24, the global interim tariff expires over 10 percent, which Trump had levied on the EU, among other things, after the Supreme Court had declared its tariff increases, decreed on April 2, 2025, as illegal. Trump wants to replace the interim tariff with new tariffs on another legal basis, the so-called Section 301. On this legal basis, the US Trade Representative has already launched two investigations against numerous states, including the EU, in March.[iv]
Against this background, it is currently completely unclear which goods and industries the US will impose new tariffs on in the future and how high these will be. For this reason, it would also be extremely short-sighted on the part of the EU to implement the tariff deal before it is even decided which import tariffs the US will impose after the summer.
Unpredictable risks: Section 301 investigations
The Section 301 investigations pose significant risks, especially for European industry, which is currently under severe pressure. The two investigations examine whether U.S. trading partners are taking insufficient measures against imports of forced labour products, and whether structural overcapacity and induced exports are affecting the U.S. economy. The investigation into forced labour concerns 60 states and regions that have overcapacity 16. The EU is also affected by both.
In the explanatory memorandum to the investigation into forced labour, the US Trade Representative argues that the lack of measures against the import of cheap products from forced labour affects the export opportunities of US companies. Although individual economies such as the EU have announced measures in this regard, they have not yet been implemented.[v]
In fact, the forced labour regulation already adopted in the EU will not be implemented until December 2027.[vi] So, at least until then, the US could impose tariffs on EU goods should this Section 301 investigation go to the EU's detriment. The US is mainly targeting exports from China, as many companies – besides Chinese and European ones – are accused of sourcing goods from Chinese forced labour, thereby gaining illegitimate competitive advantages.
According to investigative research, among other things, the Muslim minority of Uyghurs inside and outside the Chinese province of Xinjiang is affected by state-imposed forced labour. Products or raw materials from Chinese forced labour should be proven, for example, in the supply chains of the automotive, textile and clean-tech industries.[vii]
Even more risky for European industry, however, is the Section 301 investigation into structural overcapacity. The explanatory memorandum to this investigation states that structural overcapacity is often reflected in persistent trade surpluses supported by government measures such as subsidies, domestic demand restraint and low-wage policies. There is structural overcapacity not only in China – the country is at the heart of these allegations – but also in the EU.[viii]
The US Trade Representative mentions Germany and Ireland as the only examples of EU countries, i.e. the two EU countries with the highest bilateral trade surpluses vis-à-vis the US. German surpluses are mainly accounted for by exports of cars, car parts, machinery, electronics, chemical and pharmaceutical products. As an indicator of overcapacity, the justification refers to the low capacity utilisation in these sectors, which was only 72.7 percent in the German chemical industry at the beginning of 2026.
Ireland’s pharmaceutical industry, which accounts for the bulk of Ireland’s surpluses, also has a similarly low capacity utilisation rate. An important background here: Many of Ireland's pharmaceutical and tech companies are branches of US corporations that take advantage of Ireland's low taxes. Many of these subsidiaries produce both in Ireland and through contract manufacturing in third countries such as China. Through the tax haven of Ireland, they then export their goods back to the US market or other markets, for example in the EU. Through the Irish subsidiaries, the US companies reduce their tax payments – and thus harm the tax authorities in the US, the EU and other countries.[ix]
The Section 301 investigations therefore show how specifically the US targets individual industries and products, especially the German and Irish industries. In Germany, a large part of the export-dependent industry is at risk of being burdened with new US tariffs, the amount of which cannot be estimated. The investigations also hit sore points in the countries under review, such as the underutilisation of production capacity due to weak domestic demand and wage moderation in Germany or the acceleration of international tax competition by Ireland.
Last but not least, the investigations clearly show how short-sighted a hasty implementation of the customs deal in the EU would be. After all, it is only when the US has completed Section 301 investigations and fixed the new tariffs that there is a legal basis at all that could bring at least a minimum of stability and predictability to bilateral trade relations.
Rollback: No linkage to environmental and social standards
Since the 1990s, the EU has made tariff preferences in its trade agreements dependent not only on the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, but also on compliance with international environmental and social standards. These are defined in sustainability chapters, which are not sanctioned but can lead to a complaint procedure in the event of infringements. These environmental standards include, for example, the international treaties on climate or species protection, while labour standards include the core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO). In recent EU trade agreements, ratification of the Paris Agreement on climate change has also been declared an essential, and thus also sanctioned, component (EU agreements with Great Britain, New Zealand, Mercosur, Indonesia and Mexico).
However, it is precisely the agreement with the main EU trading partner – the US – that is not bound by any environmental or labour standards, although the EU even grants immediate duty-free treatment for all industrial goods. This is not only a blatant double standard for the EU, but once again a break with its previous trade policy practice.
This deficit is all the more serious because Trump is trampling on climate protection and trade union rights. For example, he led the US to withdraw from the Paris Agreement once again and dragged down a whole range of social standards, including regulations on minimum wages, non-discrimination and occupational safety and health.[x] The deficit also illustrates how unreliable the often sought-after talk of the EU's value-based foreign policy is. The EU institutions are failing miserably, as the retrogressive trilogue compromise attests, especially vis-à-vis trading partners that require firm principles.
Extensive concessions: Bad harbingers for the Framework Agreement
The significant concessions to the US side, the renunciation of its own means of pressure and the complete break with the EU's existing trade policy standards are bad harbingers for the entire framework agreement on which the EU continues to negotiate with the US. After parliamentary approval of the customs deal, the first part of the broader framework agreement, the US is almost encouraged to press further concessions on the EU's other commitments.
For example, the Commission is already signalling a startling move to meet the commitment to import $750 million worth of fossil energy (mainly cracked liquefied natural gas) from the US. According to media reports, the Commission is considering suspending the penalties for violating the EU Methane Regulation.[xi] The U.S. liquefied natural gas exporters, together with the U.S. government, have mobilized massively against this regulation. This is because they fear that their sales opportunities in the EU could be jeopardised by the regulation.
Due to the willingness to grant concessions, the EU's digital and competition law is also coming under increasing pressure. Under the Framework Agreement, the EU has committed to removing ‘unjustified barriers’ to digital trade, including digital taxes, the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. Against this background, the establishment of a new bilateral body to give the US a say in the implementation of EU digital law and related antitrust proceedings is alarming.[xii] The current deregulation agenda of the European Commission also bears the signature of American tech giants and the US government in many places.[xiii]
Press & Background
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Photo: European Union, 2025: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/media/photo/P-067620
[i] https://www.euractiv.com/news/meps-expected-to-back-us-trade-deal-despite-weaker-safeguards/
[ii] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260323IPR38830/eu-us-trade-deal-meps-set-conditions-for-lowering-tariffs-on-us-products
[iii] https://www.euractiv.com/news/meps-expected-to-back-us-trade-deal-despite-weaker-safeguards/
[iv] https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations
[v] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-17/pdf/2026-05151.pdf
[vi] https://www.csr-in-deutschland.de/EN/Legislation/EU-forced-labour-regulation/eu-forced-labour-regulation.html
[vii] https://refugees.org/made-in-china-forced-labor-and-the-uyghur-people/
[viii] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Enforcement/Section%20301/Initiation%20Notice%202026-05214.pdf
[ix] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op350~76ae69c4ac.en.pdf
[x] https://power-shift.de/eu-usa-handelsvertrag/
[xi][xi] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu- methane regulation-bruessel-erwaegt-strafen-bei-verstoessen-suspende/
[xii] https://netzpolitik.org/2026/neues-gremium-geplant-eu-will-trump-bei-digitalgesetzen-entgegenkommen/
[xiii] https://corporateeurope.org/en/2026/01/article-article-how-big-tech-shaped-eus-roll-back-digital-rights
