Source: Self-presentation based on publications of the EU Commission

A key element of this roadmap is the Critical Raw Materials Act (Critical Raw Materials Act ), adopted in April 2024.

In order to implement this law effectively, the EU needs to develop trade relations with countries rich in raw materials. In the words of the European Commission: “International trade is central to supporting global production and ensuring diversified supply”. To this end, the European Commission has launched various trade policy instruments: Trade agreements with own energy and raw material chapters, strategic raw material partnerships as well as other partnerships specific to hydrogen and renewable energies (e.g. with Uruguay) and the Global Gateway strategy. A Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement was also recently agreed. It also aims to combat unfair trade practices and restrictions and, together with the Member States, to: Export credit guarantees  and further financial support to secure and promote investments abroad. An exchange forum between exporting and importing countries of critical raw materials, set up by the USA, is also important. the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) Forum .

Like Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced, a further one will be added to these instruments in the coming 2024-2029 legislative term, the exact form of which is not yet known:

CTIPs are part of the Clean Industrial Plan (Clean industrial deal), whose elaboration Ursula von der Leyen promised for the first 100 days of their mandate.

These instruments are intended to create a level playing field for all companies (national and international), to position European companies well in the competition for raw materials markets in other countries and to be beneficial for both the European and the economy of the resource-rich country, i.e. to establish so-called ‘win-win partnerships’. They should also contribute to the implementation of the twin transition on a global level.

The question is whether the trade policy instruments mentioned above meet these demands and the challenges listed above. For this purpose, we will examine them individually.

Since its 2015 ‘Trade for All Strategy’, the EU has integrated specific energy and raw materials chapters into its trade agreements. The promotion of trade in raw materials is not done through these chapters alone. Trade agreements are in principle intended to simplify and facilitate the exchange of all exported and imported goods and services as much as possible. This is mainly done through the reduction of customs duties and other taxes understood as barriers to trade (e.g. export taxes) and requirements (e.g. with regard to technical standards, or also requirements for the employment of domestic workers or the use of local inputs). In this respect, these agreements are particularly important for large, internationally active companies, which hope for less control and unhindered market access as well as a level playing field for all companies in one country. However, this also means that national or local companies that do not have the same technical equipment as global corporations often fall behind. In addition, this United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) pointed out that raw material-rich and exporting countries in particular are struggling with the environmental consequences of their extractive trading model. Trade agreements, however, exacerbate pressure on the environment in resource-rich countries without guaranteeing that the local population benefits from the extraction of raw materials. Some chapters in the EU's trade agreements exemplify this:

Energy and Raw Materials Chapters (ERM)

The declared objective of the ERM is to promote access to energy and raw materials as well as sustainable development (especially in the field of renewable energy). To this end, barriers to trade and investment in the energy sector are to be lowered and government measures and regulations that distort competition or hinder trade are to be abolished. However, the ERM is not only about securing access to critical raw materials, but also to fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas. The texts and scope of the ERM in the respective agreements are not identical. However, the basic structure and its goals are always the same.

The ERM chapters contain clauses that:

1. Prohibit import and export restrictions, including any export bans and export taxes or other taxes on raw materials.
2. Ban import and export monopolies for certain raw materials
3. prohibit a state price setting for the export of raw materials, i.e.: there must be no difference between the price of a commodity on the national market and its export price.
4. guarantee access to energy transport infrastructure for European companies.

A detailed description of these provisions can be found in the following PowerShift publications:

• Travel guide: Partnership on an equal footing? – The EU-Chile Trade and Investment Agreement (2024)
• Guide “Global Just Green Transformation?” (2023)
• Alternatives for the ‘Energy and Raw Materials Chapters’ in EU trade agreements (2020)
• New commodity chapters in EU trade agreements: An inventory (2019)

Investment liberalisation

In general, EU trade agreements contain provisions to make it easier for European companies to make investments in the partner country. A central chapter for this is the one on the liberalisation of investment. Particularly interesting for the raw material sector is the ban, so-called performance requirements (performance requirements) to investors. This means that the implementation of projects or investments in the country must not be subject to conditions such as technology or knowledge transfer. In addition, companies must not be required to carry out a certain percentage of processing in the country, to use local products for further processing (domestic content) or create a certain number of jobs for local people. As a result, trade agreements promote foreign investment, but they do not serve the local population, but above all the investing companies.

Investment protection

Both the trade agreement with Mexico and that with Chile contain a chapter on ‘investment protection’. This grants foreign investors the exclusive right to sue states before international arbitral tribunals for compensation payments in the millions and even billions if their enterprises are hindered, restricted or even worthless by state regulation. This includes the termination of a mining license due to environmental concerns or social conflicts. In recent years, these so-called investor-state arbitration proceedings (Investor-state dispute settlement, ISDS), which are associated with mining, increased sharply. A 2023 published study the Consulting Firm CharlesRiver Associates assumes that this trend will intensify due to the increasing demand for minerals for the green transformation. After gold, which is not a critical commodity, conflicts between investors and governments are particularly important in the context of copper mines. Latin America is already the continent most deplored by mining companies. Nearly 45% ISDS mining lawsuits registered between 2016 and 2022 target Latin American countries, including Chile and Mexico. Lawsuits can also come when states adopt new regulations on environmental and climate protection that affect investors' profit prospects. How often this has already happened, shows the “Global ISDS Tracker” Impressive. It documents 129 ISDS lawsuits related to state environmental and climate protection measures.

In most of the current 1368 known ISDS lawsuits Investors worldwide (as of February 2025) benefit, either because the tribunal gives them the right, or because they agree with the state on appropriate compensation. The Compensation payments, awarded to investors by arbitral tribunals, has averaged over $250 million in recent years – money that states then lack to spend on education, health and energy transition.

The investment protection chapters in the agreements with Chile and Mexico would reflect the existing bilateral investment agreements (Bilateral investment treaties, BIT) between EU Member States and the two countries. At the same time, they extend investment protection to those countries that do not have a BIT with Chile or Mexico. In the case of: Chile This means that companies from twelve other EU member states have the opportunity to sue the country in an arbitral tribunal. In the case of: Mexico It is even 13.

Strategic raw material partnerships

Announced in your Raw materials action plan 2020, As of 2021, the European Commission started to sign agreements on cooperation in the raw materials sector with countries rich in raw materials. Thierry Breton, formerly EU Internal Market Commissioner, described these partnership agreements as complementary to EU trade agreements. Although not legally binding, they constitute a ‘policy framework for concrete bilateral cooperation in the field of raw materials’.

According to the Action Plan, the Strategic Raw Materials Partnerships aim to ensure a diversified and sustainable supply of critical raw materials. In the same way, the EU wants to help resource-rich countries to “sustainable development assist their mineral resources by supporting improved local governance and the dissemination of responsible mining practices, which in turn contribute to value creation in the mining sector and drive economic and social development.”

Since 2021, the European Commission 14 such partnerships launched (as of February 2025), with: Serbia (2024), Australia (2024), Uzbekistan (2024), Rwanda (2024), Norway (2024), Greenland (2023), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2023), Zambia (2023), Chile (2023), Argentina (2023), Namibia (2022), Kazakhstan (2022), Ukraine (2021), Canada (2021). And more to follow.

Initially, these partnerships are only a loose, non-binding agreement on cooperation in the raw materials sector under international law. The basic structure of the respective partnerships is very similar and should follow the following guidelines:

• enhanced cooperation on sustainable value chains for raw materials (including in some cases hydrogen (Chile) and e-batteries (Serbia), including the enforcement of trade facilitation;
• cooperation and, where appropriate, mobilisation of funding for infrastructure development and the development of new mining projects;
• cooperation to achieve sustainable and responsible production of raw materials and, where appropriate, support for capacity building for further processing;
• Cooperation in research and innovation and, where appropriate, "good governance" (good governance).

Within the following six months after the conclusion of the partnership, a roadmap with concrete areas and projects for cooperation will be drawn up. However, although almost all partnerships were signed more than six months ago, so far only two roadmaps are publicly available: with Ukraine and with the DRC. Reading the agreements as well as the roadmap shows what the EU is all about:

1. ensure their own supply of raw materials.
2. to better position European companies in the global competition for access and use of corresponding raw materials.

This conclusion is also reached by an Study by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (2024). Another analysis of 11 NGOs and civil society alliances (2023) also criticises that:

1. the agreements are so general that they do not reflect the actual needs and circumstances of the partner countries concerned.
2. neither in the negotiation process nor thereafter are civil society actors involved in the implementation and overall there is no transparency with regard to the strategic raw materials partnerships.
3. there is no binding obligation to comply with human rights and environmental due diligence obligations, but only vaguely formulated to ensure that care is taken. Concrete measures and controls are not mentioned.
4. support for the development of own value chains in countries rich in raw materials is also formulated superficially.

In fact, the promotion of value chains in the commodity-rich countries is likely to be hampered by trade agreements that are binding under international law and also provide for sanctions. Because these put many stones in the way of resource-rich countries in the design of their own raw material strategy.

Global Gateway

The Global Gateway Strategy was launched by the European Commission in 2021. It is According to own information a large-scale initiative by which the EU is making its contribution to the $15 trillion It aims to increase the funding gap for infrastructure projects worldwide, mainly in the areas of climate, energy, transport and digital infrastructure, as well as in the health and education sectors. In addition, it is a counteroffer to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and is intended to strengthen the EU especially in those regions where Chinese investors have gained massive influence. Although the focus is on the promotion and financing of physical infrastructure, it is also intended to create the necessary framework conditions for the projects to achieve the desired results, inter alia by:attractive investment and business-friendly trading conditions” are established.

The Global Gateway is also a key element of European development cooperation and is being implemented on several occasions within the framework of the EU Aid for Trade Progress Report It is called (2024). The Aid for Trade Strategy the European Union envisages linking development finance to commitments to market opening and concrete investment opportunities for European companies. In this respect, Global Gateway also serves as a door opener for companies and products from Europe. In this context, it is presented as a “paradigm shift”. Instead of making funds directly available for the construction of schools, a close integration of state money for development financing and private investment would supposedly achieve better results. by Marlene Holzner, Head of Unit, International Partnerships, European Commission. That is why the private sector is crucial in the implementation of Global Gateway and is promoted accordingly. Thus, business and financing opportunities for investors are clearly arranged on a separate page summarized. The European Commission also regularly organises "business fora" to bring investors together with policy makers and other relevant stakeholders from strategically interesting countries and to announce partnerships (see e.g. Mauritania and Mexico). Through these initiatives and a combination of public and private funding, between 2021 and 2027 €300 billion They will be enslaved by what half in African countries And another $45 billion. Latin Let's go. In order to attract investors to such projects, the EU uses various financial instruments to minimise costs and risks for investors. Here comes a Most of the money, which are provided, for example, as loan guarantees, from the EU’s main development cooperation instrument, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE). These funds are complemented by funding from the financial and development finance institutions of the 27 member states.

First concrete Flagship projects were 2023 presented. This year, the European Commission 90 projects Africa, Asia and Latin America, which should be developed as part of the Global Gateway. In 2024, 138 projects and for 2025 46 others added.

Almost 50% all projects In 2023 and 2024, the EU Commission allocated the area of ‘climate and energy’, focusing on the promotion of green hydrogen, the extraction of critical raw materials, the construction of high-voltage lines, electricity generators, wind turbines and solar panels. 22% of the projects concern the transport sector and 13% Digitalisation. Only 16% can be attributed to the field of education and health. A trend that continues in the selection of projects in 2025. Decisions on the inclusion of projects as “flagships” under the Global Gateway will be taken by a specific working group chaired by the respective EU Presidency. They will receive strategic advice from the Global Gateway Board, chaired by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Member States and other EU institutions, including financial institutions, can also make proposals. According to which criteria the projects are selected, it is unclear. Overall, the European Commission handles information on concrete projects very sparingly, in some cases the titles are so general (“Critical Raw Materials in Central Asia”) that it is impossible to know what it is about in concrete terms. There were also a number of projects Already before the beginning of Global Gateway and have now been merged under its roof.

Two advisory groups are also part of Global Gateway's functional structure: The Global Gateway Business Advisory Group (BAG) and the Advisory platform for civil society and local authorities of the Global Gateway (CSP).

The BAG consists of 59 European, internationally active companies and business associations, including German Post/DHL, Siemens, Bayer and Allianz. It is not clear why these companies and associations were selected. Their unselfish commitment to environmental, climate and human rights protection or their contribution to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals In any case, it could not have been the reason. 11 of these companies have already brought one or more group actions before arbitral tribunals, almost exclusively against countries that have entered the official List of "developing countries" stand.

Seven BAG companies have already signed specific contracts under the GG projects benefit from: Moller Maersk, Enel, Meridiam, Orange, Nokia, Total Energies, Siemens. Five of them have already sued countries in the Global South before investor-state arbitration tribunals.

Some companies that sue states before exclusive arbitral tribunals are also known to: Violating human rights, destroying the environment and expelling people from their land; or Governments for Bribe orders. The same applies to other companies in this advisory group, such as Bayer, which has been criticised for years for being dangerous in the EU.Pesticides still exported in large quantities to other countries.

The question is to what extent these companies are credible. Core principles Global Gateway, including: Democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, establishment of partnerships on an equal footing. Rather, the BAG seems to be another space for companies to interests Unrestricted and privileged communication.

Contrary to the BAG, this 57-member CSP a much smaller role. In addition, members criticise the low transparency not only with regard to the selection of members in the FOPH and the CSP, but also with regard to the projects themselves. This is how one criticizes Representatives of the Africa Platform:

The Commission seems to have only assigned a monitoring function to CSOs, assuming that they agree with the projects or their approach. Nor was it willing to involve civil society in identifying projects with clear multipliable development outcomes. What is even more frustrating is that the Commission is also unwilling to give details of how the individual projects came about or whether they were actually co-designed by the partner states. In fact, civil society lacks the power to influence Global Gateway itself and to rethink the entire Global Gateway concept to target projects that meet the development needs of partner countries.

And that's not enough. The criticism of Global Gateway is comprehensive and comes not only from the civil society side. Even the largest employers' association in the EU, BusinessEurope, calls for more transparency on the individual projects, the reason for their selection, their current status, the donors and beneficiaries. Civil society organisations criticise the fact that the initiative is a top-down approach, which now dominates European development policy, lacks democratic voices and does not allow the interested public or the European Parliament to participate effectively. Instead of aligning development-funded projects with the real needs of partner countries, they focus on opportunities for investors and the European Union's strategic and geopolitical interests in diversifying its sources of raw materials and energy, but also on: Migration control. He also recently called for European Economic and Social Committee concrete sustainability impact assessments and active involvement of civil society in decision-making processes of the Global Gateway strategy.

Global Gateway is also driving the privatization of government services and infrastructure. There is a risk that the debt of the largely already highly indebted countries of the Global South will rise further as a result. The problem with this strategy is being addressed by Rilli Lappalainen, President of CONCORD, a European association of development NGOs. summarised:

We are truly shocked that DG INTPA's vision for international partnerships over the next five years is basically a trade and investment strategy for the EU based on its geopolitical interests. These interests are defined by competition and the economic security of the EU. Nowhere do we see an interest in partner countries' priorities, let alone an interest in improving people's lives.